The Lessons of Vietnam
Was it
possible for the United States to preserve a non-communist South Vietnam?
Victory
requires breaking an adversary’s will to fight or its capacity to wage
war.
We do know
what did not work: commitment of over 500,000 US troops; release of over
8,000,000 tons of bombs on suspected enemy targets; and a strategy of punishing
North Vietnam from the air while attempting to grind down enemy strength in the
South via seeking out and destroying his big units in the Central Highlands and
around the DMZ.
Westmoreland
dismissed the alternative of a population protection--or
enclave—strategy. He chose to kill communist regulars rather than protect
friendlies, no doubt in part because he mistakenly assumed that by doing the
former he was accomplishing the latter. Underestimation of North Vietnam's
tenacity, overestimation of its vulnerability to strategic bombing, and an
inability to kill enemy troops in the field at a rate exceeding the communist
side's capacity to replace them (the notorious "cross-over point").
Contrary to
Westmoreland's conviction that search-and-destroy would deprive the communists
of the initiative, the enemy for most of the war managed to control his own
casualties by determining the initiation of as much as 88 percent of all
tactical engagements. Until the Tet Offensive, the communist side sought
population control, not territorial acquisition, and therefore routinely
refused combat except in the most favorable circumstances.
Was the
Vietnam War winnable?
Despite a
commitment of over 500,000 ground troops and the release of over 8 million tons
of bombs on suspected enemy targets, the United States failed to preserve a
non-Communist South Vietnam.
Read Jeffrey
Record’s essay “Vietnam
in Retrospect: Could We Have Won?”
Answer the
following questions:
1. What
strategy did the United States adopt in Vietnam?
2. In what
ways did the United States underestimate its adversaries and overestimate its
own strengths?
3. Do you
think a different strategy would have been more successful?
4. What would
victory in Vietnam have required, or was victory not a realistic objective?
The Lessons
of Vietnam
After the end
of Persian Gulf War in 1991, Colin Powell, then chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff, outlined his vision for efficient and decisive military action. His plan
is now referred to as the Powell Doctrine. He said that six questions must be
answered before U.S. forces could be committed to combat abroad.
1. Is A Vital
U.S. Interest At Stake?
Before the
United States goes to war, there must a clear risk to national security
2. Will We
Commit Sufficient Resources To Win?
Force, when
used, should be overwhelming and disproportionate to the force used by the
enemy.
3. Are Our
Objectives Clearly Defined?
In
Powell’s words: "We owe it to the men and women who go in harm's way
to make sure that this is always the case and that their lives are not
squandered for unclear purposes." In addition, there must be a clear exit
strategy from the conflict in which the military is engaged.
4. Will We
Sustain the Commitment?
Is the
government prepared to sustain the effort if things go wrong.
5. Is There A
Reasonable Expectation that the Public and Congress Will Support the Operation?
There must be
strong support for the campaign by the general public.
6. Have we
exhausted our other options?
Military
action should be used only as a last resort.